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ABSTRACT
Many articles have been written about the value of incorpo-
rating an understanding of history and philosophy of sci-
ence into science education and this has included the teach-
ing of chemistry. Given the immense role that the periodic 
table plays in chemistry it is important to be clear about a 
historical and philosophical perspective on the periodic ta-
ble and its possible ramiﬁcations for the way in which chem-
istry is presented. The article presents a critique of a paper 
by Niaz, Rodriguez and Brito who have addressed the rele-
vance of historical and philosophical aspects of the periodic 
table in an article in which they have claimed that Mende-
leev’s periodic table should be regarded as a theory. In addi-
tion they have claimed that Mendeleev was a supporter of 
the atomic theory and have addressed some general philo-
sophical questions concerning inductivism and the role of 
prediction and accommodation in the acceptance of scien-
tiﬁc discoveries.
Introduction
The purpose of the present article is to consider several no-
tions that have been argued by Niaz, Rodriguez and Brito 
concerning Mendeleev’s periodic table (Niaz, Rodriguez, 
Brito, 2004). Among the several claims made by these au-
thors the main one seems to be that contrary to most ex-
perts in the ﬁeld, Mendeleev’s periodic table was a theory 
rather than a law, or a classiﬁcation. In addition there are 
many claims made regarding what the authors believe to be 
a naïve inductivist stance taken by historians of science. In-
stead the authors propose that taking a Lakatosian view of 
the development of science adds further support to their 
claim whereby Mendeleev’s periodic table is a theory rather 
than a law. In arriving at this conclusion the authors can-
vass what they take to be support from a wide variety of 
sources including some physicists, chemists and some con-
temporary philosophers of science including Cartwright 
and Giere. It is my contention that the majority of such sam-
plings may have been taken out of context and that betray 
some confusion over the central issues under discussion.
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Periodicity in the periodic table and atomic 
theory
The authors devote considerable space to a discussion of 
Mendeleev’s writings on atomic theory and argue that his 
views were ambivalent. They claim that most historians 
take a naïve inductivist approach to the development of the 
periodic table and that they consider that Mendeleev pro-
ceeded on the basis of empirical observations rather than 
the atomic theory. However, there is no reference to, or 
mention of, the work of Popper who was the most signiﬁ-
cant critic of inductivism and whose work Lakatos freely 
acknowledged to be the starting point to his own contribu-
tions (Popper, 1959; Larvor, 1998). In addition, Niaz et al. 
may be misconstruing the notion of naïve inductivism while 
wanting to convince their readers of the virtue of a Lakato-
sian view, with all the zeal of new converts. Niaz et al. do not 
seem to appreciate that Popper, and Lakatos for that matter, 
have exerted a considerable inﬂuence on historians as well 
as philosophers of science and they often fail to quote any 
historian or philosopher when accusing them in general of 
still operating within an inductivist framework.
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For example, the thrust of the argument in section 2 of 
the paper under discussion consists of Niaz et al. claiming 
that historians of science believe that Mendeleev arrived at 
his periodic system merely on the basis of observations. 
Moreover the authors wish to claim that Mendeleev drew 
on atomic theory rather than mere observational data and 
that this essentially shows that we need a post-inductivist 
approach to understand the issues. Inductivism is therefore 
reduced to the view that scientiﬁc developments are based 
on observations rather than on the use of theories. Be that 
as it may, I would like to examine some of the detailed claims 
that are made.
The authors cite historian of chemistry, van Spronsen, in 
saying that the catalyst for the development of the periodic 
system was the Karlsruhe meeting of 1860, which clariﬁed 
the distinction between atom and molecules and deﬁned 
such concepts as valence. Niaz et al. immediately raise the 
following question,
In spite of this fairly categorical statement with respect 
to the role played by the atomic theory by a major histo-
rian of the periodic table, many historians attribute its 
success primarily to empirically observed properties of 
the elements (inductive generalization). (Niaz et al., 2004, 
p. 273)
In fact almost every source on the periodic table seems to 
agree on the “catalytic power” of the Karlsruhe meeting in 
the discovery of periodicity not just in the case of Mende-
leev but also Odling and Lothar Meyer. But whether or not 
this conference did indeed have any such catalytic effect 
does not immediately imply that van Spronsen, or anybody 
else, is claiming that atomic theory per se might have been 
essential to the discovery of chemical periodicity. One could 
distinguish between the terms atom and molecule for ex-
ample, regardless of whether one believed in the literal exis-
tence of physical atoms. There is a considerable literature 
on the question of chemical atomism, which treats ‘the 
atom’ as the smallest amount of matter, which could enter 
into chemical combination (chemical atomism), as opposed 
to the belief that atoms were microscopic physical entities 
with a ‘real’ existence (physical atomism) (Fleck, 1963). Niaz 
and his co-authors are either unaware of this literature or 
have mysteriously chosen to ignore it. 
Instead Niaz et al. pose the following rhetorical question,
So how could Mendeleev conceptualize periodicity as a 
function of the atomic theory? An answer to this ques-
tion will precisely show Mendeleev’s ingenuity, farsight-
edness, creativity, and the ability to ‘‘speculate’’. (Niaz 
et al., 2004, p. 273)
It would appear that Niaz et al. believe that if they can show 
that Mendeleev indeed possessed the ability to “speculate” 
then they can oppose the vast majority of historians of sci-
ence who apparently wrongly hold that Mendeleev was not 
a speculator but merely followed the observational evidence 
like a good naïve inductivist. Now one of the major prob-
lems that Niaz et al. face in this task is that there is ample 
evidence that Mendeleev largely rejected the atomic theory 
of his day or, as the authors correctly report, was ambiva-
lent about the role of atomic theory in his writings.1
The authors proceed to enumerate a series of what they 
term “steps” that are presumably intended to provide evi-
dence for Mendeleev’s surreptitious use the atomic theory. 
The ﬁrst of these steps is,
Step 1: Even in his ﬁrst publication Mendeleev referred 
to the relationship, albeit implicitly, between periodici-
ty, atomic weights and valence: “The arrangement ac-
cording to atomic weight corresponds to the valence of 
the element and to a certain extent the difference in 
chemical behavior, for example Li, Be, B, C, N, O, F”. 
(Mendeleev, 1869, p. 405, original emphasis). (Niaz et al., 
2004, p. 273).
One can only presume that the authors are drawing atten-
tion to Mendeleev’s use of the term “atomic weight” as evi-
dence of his support for the atomic theory. Similarly, the 
second step is announced without any comment on how 
it is supposed to be supporting the main thesis that, un-
beknownst to himself, Mendeleev was in fact a physical 
atomist,
Step 2: After the discovery of gallium and scandium, Men-
deleev expressed the relationship between atomic weight* 
and atomic theory much more explicitly: ‘It is by study-
ing them [atomic and molecular weights], more than by 
any other means, that we can conceive the idea of an at-
om and of a molecule. By this fact alone we are enabled 
to perceive the great inﬂuence that studies carried on in 
this direction can exercise on the progress of chemistry. . . 
The expression atomic weight implies, it is true, the hy-
pothesis of the atomic structure of bodies’ (Mendeleev, 
1879, p. 243, emphasis added. The asterisk leads the read-
er to the following footnote: ‘By replacing the expression 
of atomic weight by that of elementary weight, I think we 
should, in the case of elements, avoid the conception of 
atoms’). (Niaz et al., 2004, p. 273-274)
This surely is a clear indication that to the extent that Men-
deleev mentioned the term “atom” he was doing so in the 
spirit of chemical atomism and not physical atomism and 
again raises the distinction that the authors seem reluctant 
to examine.
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Step 3 offers more textual evidence of Mendeleev’s am-
bivalence concerning atomic theory,
Step 3: Another example of Mendeleev’s ambivalence can 
be observed from the following: ‘I shall not form any hy-
potheses, either here or further on, to explain the nature 
of the periodic law; for, ﬁrst of all, the law itself is too sim-
ple*’ (Mendeleev, 1879, p. 292. The asterisk leads the read-
er to the following footnote: ‘However, I do not ignore 
that to completely understand a subject we should pos-
sess, independently of observations (and experiences) 
and of laws (as well as systems), the meanings of both 
one and the other’). (Niaz et al., 2004, p. 274)
Finally in their step 4, the authors begin to offer what they 
regard as positive evidence for what they believe is Mende-
leev’s support for atomic theory,
Step 4: Although Mendeleev stated in 1879 that he would 
not formulate an hypothesis, ten years later in his famous 
Faraday lecture, Mendeleev (1889) not only attributed 
the success of the periodic law to Cannizaro’s ideas on the 
atomic theory (pp. 636–637), but went on to explicitly 
formulate the following hypothesis: ‘the veil which con-
ceals the true conception of mass, it nevertheless indi-
cated that the explanation of that conception must be 
searched for in the masses of atoms; the more so, as all 
masses are nothing but aggregations, or additions, of 
chemical atoms’ (Mendeleev, 1889, p. 640, emphasis 
added). (Niaz et al., 2004, p. 274)
Needless to say, this passage does not provide very compel-
ling ammunition for Niaz et al. for at least a couple of rea-
sons. Firstly it is a statement made by Mendeleev a full 20 
years after the discovery of chemical periodicity. Secondly it 
is a statement made to a general audience at an award lec-
ture by a scientist looking back at his achievements. Such 
statements are notoriously prone to grandiose generaliza-
tions which may, or may not have, in fact contributed to the 
discovery in question. It can still be argued that Mendeleev 
took “the masses of atoms” to be elemental masses and that 
he was not even now admitting to the inﬂuence of atomic 
theory as such.
Finally we have step 5, which is reproduced here in its 
entirety in order to avoid any possible distortion to what 
Niaz et. al. might be arguing for.
Step 5: Again, at the Faraday lecture, Mendeleev (1889) 
took extreme care to explain the periodicity of properties 
of chemical elements on the basis of atomic theory. We 
cite at length:
The periodic law has shown that our chemical individu-
als [atoms] display a harmonic periodicity of properties, 
dependent on their masses. . . An example will better il-
lustrate this view. The atomic weights—
Sb = 120        Ag = 108        Cd = 112        In = 113        Sn = 118 
Te = 125            I =  127
steadily increase, and their increase is accompanied by a 
modiﬁcation of many properties which constitutes the 
essence of the periodic law. Thus, for example, the densi-
ties of the above elements decrease steadily, being res-
pectively—
10.5      8.6     7.4      7.2      6.7      6.4     4.9
while their oxides contain an increasing quantity of oxy-
gen:—
Ag2O  Cd2O2  In2O3  Sn2O4  Sb2O5  Te2O6  I2O7
 
But to connect by a curve the summits of the ordinates 
expressing any of these properties would involve the re-
jection of Dalton’s law of multiple proportions. Not only 
are there no intermediate elements between silver, which 
gives AgCl, and cadmium which gives CdCl2, but, accord-
ing to the very essence of the periodic law there can be 
none; in fact a uniform curve would be inapplicable in 
such a case, as it would lead us to expect elements pos-
sessed of special properties at any point of the curve. 
(Mendeleev, 1889, pp. 640–641)
This is a clear acknowledgment of the role played by the 
atomic theory to explain periodicity in the periodic table 
(Niaz et al., 2004, p. 274-275)
Contrary to what the authors conclude in the ﬁnal line quot-
ed above, this statement is not an acknowledgement of any 
role played by atomic theory. Mendeleev’s well known re-
luctance to connect data points reporting properties of the 
elements merely shows that he regarded the elements to 
be strictly individual rather than their all being made of the 
same substance. Mendeleev consistently argued against 
the unity of matter and against Prout’s hypothesis to that 
effect. I suggest that the quotation above is not necessarily a 
reﬂection of Mendeleev’s views speciﬁcally on atoms of the 
elements.
Mendeleev as a positivist
If Mendeleev was so clearly in favor of atomic theory, and 
used it in the course of discovering chemical periodicity as 
Niaz et al. argue, it behooves them to explain why Mende-
leev himself should have gone to such lengths to conceal 
this fact. Niaz et al. are clearly aware of this problem since 
they turn to a discussion of positivism in order to provide a 
possible answer,
Throughout the 19th century positivism was the domi-
nant philosophy, which led all scientiﬁc work to be based 
strictly on experimental observations and all hypothetical 
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propositions were considered speculative and hence 
non-scientiﬁc (Brush, 1976; Gavroglu, 2000; Holton, 
1992). Mendeleev was clearly aware of this and on many 
occasions went out of his way to emphasize that the pe-
rioidic ‘law itself was a legitimate induction from the ver-
iﬁed facts’ (Mendeleev, 1889, p. 639). In the Faraday lec-
ture, Mendeleev emphasized the inductive aspect of the 
periodic law in the light of the antiatomist Marcellin 
Berthelot’s (1827–1907) criticism: ‘the illustrious Berthel-
ot, in his work Les origins de l’alchimie, 1885, 313, has 
simply mixed up the fundamental idea of the law of peri-
odicity with the ideas of Prout, the alchemists, and Dem-
ocritus about primary matter. But the periodic law, based 
as it is on the solid and wholesome ground of experimen-
tal research, has been evolved independently of any con-
ception as to the nature of the elements’ (Mendeleev, 
1889, p. 644, emphasis added). Apparently, Mendeleev’s 
dilemma was that on the one hand he could rightly claim 
that the periodic law was based on experimental proper-
ties of the elements (an aspiration of scientists in the late 
19th century), and yet he could not give up the bigger 
challenge, viz., the possible causes of periodicity, and 
hence the importance of atomic theory. (Niaz et al., 2004, 
p. 275)
In previous publications I have argued that Mendeleev was 
not in fact a positivist given his willingness to make specu-
lations about the nature of the elements, to make predic-
tions and to correct the atomic weights of several elements. 
As I have suggested, had he been a positivist Mendeleev 
might have adhered more closely to the experimental facts 
rather than allowing himself such ﬂights of fancy as con-
templating yet unknown elements (Scerri, 2007). As I have 
also argued, Mendeleev had some well-developed views on 
the dual nature of elements as ‘basic substances’ that were 
abstract and the seat of all properties on one hand, and ele-
ments as ‘simple substances’ which could manifest as vari-
ous allotropes on the other hand.2 Mendeleev also stressed 
that his periodic system was primarily a classiﬁcation of the 
elements as abstract basic substances and not as simple 
substances (Paneth, 1962; Scerri, 2006). Again, such a view 
does not appear to be typical of a positivist who might be 
inclined to pay greater attention to the observable sense of 
an ‘element’ rather than its more abstract counterpart of an 
element as a basic substance.
Whereas the authors imply that Mendeleev’s public state-
ments were made for ‘political reasons’ and that he was 
falsely trying to pass himself off as a positivist such an in-
terpretation seems a little far-fetched. We propose that 
Mendeleev was primarily expressing his disdain for the no-
tion of the unity of matter rather than trying to assert his 
allegiance to positivism. Mendeleev did in fact eschew posi-
tivism but not necessarily because he supported the impor-
tance of atomic theory.
Niaz et al. continue by claiming that their task has been ac-
complished in beginning their section 3 with the statement,
After having provided evidence for the relationship be-
tween periodicity and atomic theory in the development 
of the periodic table by Mendeleev, in this section we 
present arguments as to how predictions play an impor-
tant role in scientiﬁc theories. (Niaz et al., 2004, p. 276)
Contrary to this claim we propose that the authors have not 
in fact adduced any evidence to support such a relationship.
Prediction, novel and otherwise
Niaz et al. proceed by elaborating on how Lakatos considers 
that predictions made by any scientiﬁc theory are of para-
mount importance. Although they note in passing that 
Lakatos wrote a footnote to say that post-diction should be 
regarded as a variety of ‘prediction’ the authors seem not to 
grasp the full worth of this concession (Worrall, 1998). Rath-
er than being a mere footnote, the question of widening the 
meaning of ‘prediction’ to include post-diction, or accom-
modation, as it is sometimes termed, formed a major theme 
in Lakatos’ work. This ﬁrst came about when his then PhD 
student Zahar pointed out to Lakatos that Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity had been accepted as much for being 
able to calculate the advance of the perihelion of mercury 
(an accommodation) as for the strictly novel prediction of 
the bending of starlight which was subsequently conﬁrmed 
(Zahar, 1999).
In addition many articles have sought to explore this is-
sue more deeply in the context of the periodic table (Scerri, 
1996). Although Niaz et al. cite some of these papers they 
seem to miss the central point since they immediately re-
turn to discussing Lakatos and his view of prediction in the 
narrower sense of novel prediction. Each time that predic-
tions are referred to on the same page, Niaz et al. explain 
that they are discussing novel predictions.3 While still avoid-
ing the central issue of the meaning and role of prediction in 
the work of Lakatos, Niaz and colleagues claim that they can 
cast light on the debate between Brush on one hand and 
Scerri and Worrall on the other.
‘The time-honoured empirical criterion for a satisfactory 
theory was agreement with the observed facts. Our em-
pirical criterion for a series of theories is that it should 
produce new facts. The idea of growth and the concept of 
empirical character are soldered into one’ (p. 119, original 
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emphasis). This helps to understand the controversy be-
tween Brush (1996) and Scerri & Worrall (2001) with re-
spect to the role played by accommodation (agreement 
of observed facts with the theory) and prediction of new 
elements by Mendeleev. Following Lakatos, it appears 
that both accommodations and predictions are equally 
important for progress in scientiﬁc theories. (Niaz et al., 
2004, p. 227).
In fact Brush and Scerri and Worrall are all perfectly aware 
of Lakatos’ view that predictions and accommodations are 
equally important. Apparently unbeknownst to Niaz et al., 
Brush has for many years pursued the relative virtue of 
novel predictions and accommodations in a number of sci-
entiﬁc theories from different ﬁelds (Brush, 1995). Swim-
ming against the general consensus, Brush has claimed that 
many theories, especially in physics, were accepted as much 
for their successful accommodation of already known data 
as they were for making novel predictions. But when it came 
to chemistry, Brush was at ﬁrst reluctant to believe that the 
equal importance of novel prediction and accommodation 
had a role to play in the discovery of the periodic table. 
For some time Brush claimed that the acceptance of the 
periodic table was the one important case in which novel 
predictions had in fact played the decisive role (Brush, 
1996). The article by Scerri and Worrall argues that Brush 
should not draw back from even applying his view to the 
acceptance of the periodic table. More recently Brush sig-
naled his change of mind while concluding thus,
While chemists differed on the relative importance of 
prediction and accommodation, it seems fair to approxi-
mate the consensus as follows. The reasons for accepting 
the periodic law are, in order of importance: it accurately 
describes the correlation between physicochemical 
properties and atomic weights of nearly all known ele-
ments; it has led to useful corrections in the atomic 
weights of several elements and has helped to resolve 
controversies such as those about beryllium; and it has 
yielded successful predictions of the existence and prop-
erties of new elements (Brush, 1996, 612).
So rather than Lakatos explaining the disagreement be-
tween Brush and Scerri-Worrall, all parties have come to 
agree on this point to varying degrees.
After this brief ‘nod’ towards the current literature on the 
role of prediction, Niaz quickly return to discussing predic-
tion in the narrow sense of novelty. Now they argue that 
Mendeleev’s work must be regarded as a theory since theo-
ries are conﬁrmed by novel predictions and, as is well 
known, Mendeleev made several predictions of new ele-
ments that were indeed conﬁrmed. Again Niaz et al. allude 
to the controversy in the literature concerning novel predic-
tions and accommodations but quickly cast this issue aside 
with the statement that,
A detailed discussion goes beyond the subject of this 
study. (Niaz et al., 2004, 227)
Niaz et al. press on, once again returning to prediction of 
novel facts,
It is important to note that Mendeleev’s contribution, in 
contrast to many of his predecessors, cannot be consid-
ered as a mere accumulation of knowledge, but rather 
has the basic elements of a scientiﬁc theory. Similarly, 
van Spronsen (1969), in spite of his ambivalence with re-
spect to Mendeleev’s contribution, does recognize the 
role played by predictions (Niaz et al., 2004, 227)
It is quite remarkable in the view of the present author that 
van Spronsen of all people should be so painted as having 
begrudgingly recognized the role of predictions while large-
ly concentrating on Mendeleev’s “accumulation of knowl-
edge”.4 The line taken by Niaz also continues to beg the 
question since even if we grant that prediction in the novel 
sense was all-important, this can equally well be achieved 
by a classiﬁcation system or a law, rather than just by a the-
ory, as Niaz et al. seem to suppose. Why should the only al-
ternative to the inductive piling up of knowledge be just the 
use of theory? It would appear as though Niaz et al. regard 
the only alternative to inductivism to be the use of theory.
Even more worryingly, it appears that Niaz et al. believe 
that “hypothesis” or “conjecture”, which is surely the natural 
alternative to naive inductivism, as emphasized by Popper, 
and later Lakatos, amounts to the use of a theory. But this is 
a very unfortunate conﬂation which runs the risk of encour-
aging such people as creationists and supporters of ‘intelli-
gent design’ who notoriously confuse the term “theory” with 
the lay person’s sense of “in theory” or guesswork, or mere 
conjecture.5
One can agree with Popper and Lakatos that naïve in-
ductivism is an unreliable approach but this does not open 
the road to believing that all ‘proper science’ is only based 
on the use of “theory” as Niaz and colleagues seem to imply. 
The following section of the paper by Niaz faces the ques-
tion more directly,
Based on evidence provided in the previous two sections, 
here we present arguments as to whether Mendeleev’s 
contribution was a theory or an empirical law. There 
seems to be considerable controversy among philoso-
phers of science with respect to the nature of Mende-
leev’s contribution. Wartofsky (1968) clearly considers 
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Mendeleev’s contribution to be more than a simple em-
pirical law:
Mendeleev, for example, predicted that the blank space 
of atomic number 32, which lies between silicon and tin 
in the vertical column, would contain an element which 
was grayish-white, would be unaffected by acids and al-
kalis, and would give a white oxide when burned in air, 
and when he predicted also its atomic weight, atomic 
volume, density and boiling point, he was using the peri-
odic table as a hypothesis from which predictions could 
be deduced. This was in 1871. (p. 203, emphasis added). 
(Niaz et al., 2004, p. 278)
Although there may indeed be some controversy among 
historians and philosophers concerning the nature of Men-
deleev’s discovery, it is rather misleading to imply that such 
controversy stretches as far as some authors considering 
Mendeleev’s discovery to be of a ‘theoretical’ nature.6 For 
example, in the above quote Wartofsky clearly states that he 
regards Mendeleev as having made a “hypothesis”. Are we 
to understand that Niaz et al. are here even wanting to 
equate the notion of a hypothesis with that of a scientiﬁc 
theory? 7
On the other hand Niaz et al. do not shrink from quoting 
several historians and philosophers who have stated quite 
categorically that they do not regard Mendeleev’s approach 
to have been of a theoretical nature. This includes the phi-
losopher Dudley Shapere who considers whether Mende-
leev’s achievement was a classiﬁcation, a system, a table, or 
a law but concludes that it was more in the form of an ‘or-
dered domain’. Conversely, the one possibility that Shapere 
excludes completely is precisely the notion that Mende-
leev’s discovery involves the use of a theory. But after quot-
ing Shapere’s view Niaz et al. say nothing to counter it. Sim-
ilarly, they quote Bensaude as claiming that Mendeleev 
belonged to a positivist tradition. As the reader will recall 
Niaz et al. consider this to be an incorrect reading and yet 
they offer no argument against Bensaude.
Instead Niaz et al. seem to cast all philosophers and his-
torians in the same light and declare them to be inductivists 
and presumably ignorant of Lakatos’ insights into the na-
ture of science,
It appears that historians and philosophers of science 
generally conceptualize scientiﬁc progress to be dichoto-
mous, viz., experimental observations lead to scientiﬁc 
laws, which later facilitate the elaboration of explanatory 
theories. On the contrary, Lakatos (1970) has argued that 
‘the clash is not ‘‘between theories and facts’’ but between 
two high-level theories: between an interpretative theory 
to provide the facts and an explanatory theory to explain 
them; and the interpretative theory may be on quite as 
high a level as the explanatory theory’ (p. 129, original 
emphasis). (Niaz et al., 2004, p. 279)
Here Niaz et al. are ﬁnally revealing the reason for their 
rather unusual view that Mendeleev’s work should be re-
garded as being of a theoretical nature. However, nowhere 
do they give a sustained argument in favor of the view that 
Mendeleev’s work might have represented “an interpreta-
tive theory to provide the facts” in the sense of Lakatos. Fur-
thermore this is quite a retreat from the view that has been 
put forward up to this point in the article which consists of 
a series of claims that Mendeleev’s work was of the form of a 
“theory” tout court.
We believe that even this far more restricted sense of 
“theory”, that now emerges, cannot be sustained since Men-
deleev’s scheme, for all it’s value, did not present any form of 
interpretation of the form of the periodic table or why it was 
so effective at making successful predictions of new ele-
ments.
Niaz et al. on laws of science
It appears that Niaz et al. may regard their positive argu-
ments in favor of the theoretical nature of Mendeleev’s dis-
covery to be insufﬁcient to convince the skeptic because in 
the next section they proceed to adduce some negative ar-
guments aimed at showing that Mendeleev’s approach does 
not represent the use of a scientiﬁc law.8 Of course one 
might want to ask whether it has to be one or the other, the-
ory or law as Niaz seems to imply.9
In order to argue that Mendeleev was not operating with 
a scientiﬁc law, Niaz et al. appeal to the work of two contem-
porary philosophers of science, Nancy Cartwright and Ron-
ald Giere. As is well known Cartwright, for example, has 
claimed that all laws of science ‘lie’ in the sense that they 
never apply to specific situations because they refer to 
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unrealizable idealizations. But in making such a move Niaz 
et al. immediately blunt their argument in a serious way. 
Here they are supporting philosophers who regard all sci-
entiﬁc laws as being fundamentally ﬂawed notions. Niaz et 
al. are no longer providing an argument that speciﬁcally ap-
plies to the case of Mendeleev. Of course if all laws are guilty 
of telling lies then Mendeleev’s putative periodic law should 
be similarly regarded. This is too easy. If as Cartwright sug-
gests all scientiﬁc laws strictly lie, then of course Mende-
leev’s law too cannot be considered as a strictly valid law of 
science. But even if this were the case it would not necessar-
ily support the view championed by Niaz et al. that Mende-
leev’s approach should be regarded as a theory. Again it 
should be clear that here are more than just these two op-
tions on offer.
Is the periodic table an interpretative theory?
My ﬁnal point concerns the concluding section in Niaz et al. 
in which the authors claim,
Finally, it is concluded that Mendeleev’s contribution can 
be considered as an ‘interpretative’ theory, which became 
‘explanatory’ (Lakatos, 1970) after the periodic table was 
based on atomic numbers. (Niaz et al., 2004, p. 280)
It is very difﬁcult for the present author to see how the peri-
odic table is supposed to have changed its status from that 
of an “interpretative theory” to an “explanatory theory” as a 
result of the discovery of atomic number. One may well 
concede that the arrival of atomic number, due to van den 
Broek and Mosely, resolved an important problem in the 
periodic table, namely the existence of pair reversals such 
as the case of tellurium and iodine. If these elements were 
ordered according to atomic weight, as they were up to the 
discovery of atomic number, the two elements fell in the 
wrong order according to their chemical behavior. Ordering 
them according to their respective atomic number results 
in the correct placement of the elements in accordance with 
their chemistry. But this important advance did little to ex-
plain the periodic table. In no way did the periodic table per 
se become more explanatory after atomic number was dis-
covered.10
Rather the periodic table still awaited an explanation, 
which was soon supplied by Bohr’s discussion of the elec-
tronic conﬁguration of many-electron atoms followed by 
more detailed conﬁgurations by Stoner and Pauli (Scerri, 
2007). But even then the periodic table had not suddenly 
been transformed into an explanatory theory. The periodic 
table is the explanandum rather than the explanans and so it 
remains to this day. The periodic table, in and of itself, is not 
a theory but requires a theory in order to explain why it has 
been such a productive scientiﬁc discovery. It is important 
for these views to be debated further and clariﬁed if history 
and philosophy of science are indeed to be imported into 
science education in order to improve teaching. It would be 
interesting to hear how Niaz et al. respond to the points that 
I have raised in this article.
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